Mission Shores Association v. Pheil
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 789
COUNSEL
Law Firm of Kaiser & Swindells, Raymond T. Kaiser and J. Rodney DeBiaso for Objector and Appellant.
Peters & Freedman and Laurie S. Poole for Petitioner and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, J.-
David Pheil ("Pheil") appeals a trial court order that reduced the
percentage of votes necessary to amend the Mission Shores Association's
(the "Association") Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions ("CC&R's"). (Civ. Code, § 1356. fn. 1
) Pheil challenges the order on the grounds the trial court erred in
finding that (1) the amendment was reasonable (§ 1356, subd. (c)(5));
(2) the balloting conformed to the CC&R's (§ 1356, subd. (c)(2));
and (3) there was no impairment to the security interest of mortgagees
(§ 1356, subd. (e)(3)). We affirm the order.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The Association is the homeowners association which governs the Mission
Shores common interest development ("Mission Shores") located in Rancho
Mirage and consisting of 168 separate interests ("Homes"), in addition
to common areas and facilities. On May 12, 2004, the CC&R's were
recorded for the development.
In 2004, Pheil and his wife decided to purchase a vacation home in
Rancho Mirage. At Mission Shores, the developer's agent represented to
Pheil and his wife that they would be allowed to rent or lease a home
without restriction. According to the applicable CC&R's, an owner
may rent to a single family where the rental agreement is in writing
and subject to the CC&R's. In reliance on the agent's
representation, Pheil and his wife purchased a Home, which they rented,
on occasion, to others. As a homeowner, Pheil is a member of the
Association.
The Board of Directors for the Association ("Board") is composed of
five members, three of which were appointed by the developer. The
developer owns 11 of the 168 Homes in the development. Concerned with
how some homeowners were renting their Homes, on May 19, 2005, the
Board [166 Cal.App.4th 793]
unanimously voted to accept proposed Rule 2.10.2 of the CC&R's
(Rule 2.10.2), which provided, "'No short-term rentals or leases of
less than 30 days are allowed.'" Pheil challenged the rule. This
dispute came before Mediator Peter J. Lesser. A July 31, 2006,
mediation did not resolve the dispute. On August 23, Pheil, through his
attorney, mailed a "Demand for Internal Dispute Resolution" to attorney
James R. McCormick, Jr., an attorney for the Association, with respect
to Rule 2.10.2.
In response to the dispute over Rule 2.10.2, the Board decided to amend
the CC&R's to provide the same temporal limitation on rentals.
Additionally, the proposed amendment granted the Association the right
to evict a tenant for breach of the governing documents and to impose
the related attorney fees and court costs on the homeowner. On
September 28, 2006, the Association mailed a cover letter, voting
instructions, official ballot, the proposed amendment to the CC&R's
("Amendment"), and two envelopes to all members of record of the
Association. It presented a "redlined" version of Article II, Section
2.1 of the CC&R's, showing precisely the language to be added and
to be deleted. A deadline of November 13, 2006, was set to return the
ballots. The owners were further informed the ballots would be
tabulated at the Board meeting on November 15.
Article IV, Section 4.4.3 of the CC&R's sets forth the different
types of voting "classes." "Class A" consists of members of the
Association who own a Home. Of the 168 Homes, 157 had been sold such
that there were 157 owner votes. The remaining 11 Homes were still
owned by the developer, who was entitled to three "Class B" votes per
Home, or a total of 33 developer votes. In order for the Amendment to
pass, the Association had to obtain at least 67 percent of the voting
power of both classes. Thus, passage of the Amendment required 105
owner votes and 22 developer votes. On November 13, 2006, 132 of the
168 ballots were received. The inspectors of the election opened the
ballots and tabulated the results. In the "Class A" category, 93 owner
votes were in favor of the Amendment, 28 owner votes were against the
Amendment, and 36 owner votes abstained. In the "Class B" category, all
33 developer votes were cast in favor of the Amendment. Because the
Amendment garnered only 59 percent of the owner vote, it failed.
On March 8, 2007, pursuant to section 1356, the Association petitioned
the trial court for an order reducing the percentage of affirmative
votes required for passage of the Amendment and approving the Amendment
based upon the number of affirmative votes actually cast constituting
at least a majority of each voting class. A hearing date was set for
April 9, 2007. The Association filed a notice of hearing, memorandum of
points and authorities, [166 Cal.App.4th 794] and supporting declarations. Notice of the hearing was mailed to each homeowner of record on March 23, 2007.
Pheil opposed the petition, objecting to the imposition of a 30-day
minimum for leases on the grounds that this violated an alleged
representation made by the developers of the project when he purchased
his Home. In reply, the Association stated the reason for the minimum
lease term was to prevent use of any Home as a hotel. The Association
provided a declaration from its counsel regarding the prevalence of
CC&R restrictions containing a 30-day minimum provision.
At the initial hearing on April 9, 2007, the trial court continued the
matter to allow Pheil's counsel to obtain copies of the supporting
declarations. The second hearing was continued to allow the Association
to hold its election of directors to see if the new Board would want to
continue pursuing the petition. During the final hearing on May 25,
2007, the trial court indicated its intent to grant the petition.
By order dated June 12, 2007, the trial court found that the
Association had complied with the requirements of section 1356,
subdivision (c)(1) through (6) and that granting the petition was "not
improper" under section 1356, subdivision (e)(1) through (3). Thus, the
trial court granted the petition, which reduced the percentage required
to amend the CC&R's. Pheil filed the instant appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] "[S]ection 1356, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest
Development Act (the Act), provides that a homeowners association, or
any member, may petition the superior court for a reduction in the
percentage of affirmative votes required to amend the CC&R's if
they require approval by 'owners having more than 50 percent of the
votes in the association . . . .' [Citation.] The court may, but need
not, grant the petition if it finds all of the following: Notice was
properly given; the balloting was properly conducted; reasonable
efforts were made to permit eligible members to vote; '[o]wners having
more than 50 percent of the votes, in a single class voting structure,
voted in favor of the amendment'; and '[t]he amendment is reasonable.'
[Citation.]" (Peak Investments v. South Peak Homeowners Assn., Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1366-1367, fn. omitted.)
The purpose of section 1356 is to provide homeowners associations with
the "ability to amend [their] governing documents when, because of
voter [166 Cal.App.4th 795]
apathy or other reasons, important amendments cannot be approved by the
normal procedures authorized by the declaration. [Citation.] In
essence, it provides [an] association with a safety valve for those
situations where the need for a supermajority vote would hamstring the
association." (Blue Lagoon Community Assn. v. Mitchell (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 472, 477.)
Section 1356, subdivision (c), gives the trial court broad discretion
in ruling on such petition. Accordingly, on appeal, we review the trial
court's ruling for abuse of discretion. (Fourth La Costa Condominium Owners Assn. v. Seith (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.)
III. WAS THE AMENDMENT REASONABLE?
Pheil contends that because three of the five seats on the Board were
held by representatives of the developer, the developer "in fostering
the petition was clearly acting for its own purposes and not [those] of
the owners." Specifically, Pheil claims there is no evidence that any
individual homeowner complained about the rental of a home without
temporal restriction. Instead, Pheil notes the evidence is limited to
the vague determination by the Board and the self-serving declaration
of the Association's attorney. Given the facts that (1) the Board was
controlled by the developer who was behind the petition; (2) this was
not a case of homeowner apathy; and (3) the trial court's words suggest
that it thought the owners were entitled to a representative board,
Pheil argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding the
Amendment to be reasonable.
[2] Clearly, the Association was charged with the burden of proving the Amendment was reasonable. (Fourth La Costa Condominium Owners Assn. v. Seith, supra,
159 Cal.App.4th at p. 577.) "The term 'reasonable' in the context of
use restrictions has been variously defined as 'not arbitrary or
capricious' [citations], 'rationally related to the protection,
preservation or proper operation of the property and the purposes of
the Association as set forth in its governing instruments,' and 'fair
and nondiscriminatory.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Here, the Association argued that the need to restrict rentals to 30
days or more was to ensure the property would not become akin to a
hotel. Mission Shores is a residential community. According to the
Association's attorney, "The overwhelming majority of the [CC&R's]
that [she] review[s], both in preparing restated [CC&R's] and
reviewing existing [CC&R's], contain[s] provisions regarding
minimum lease terms of thirty (30) days or longer . . . ." As the trial
court noted, "these kinds of restrictions are very common. And . . .
many counties and cities have these restrictions that essentially when [166 Cal.App.4th 796]
you rent for less than 30 days, you're essentially operating a hotel in
a residential district." Furthermore, the court observed, "there is a
movement afoot to restrict homes from being on vacation rentals. It is
not just in this project. It is throughout California. [¶] So for
example . . . I have a home in San Luis Obispo County and they have a
very strict rule about vacation rentals. I was just reading in the
paper in Palm Springs they're talking about passing a law restricting
rentals to only 30 days or more."
"A CC&R is unreasonable if it is arbitrary and capricious, violates
the law or a fundamental public policy or imposes an undue burden on
property, and it is reasonable unless it meets those criteria.
[Citation.]" (Fourth La Costa Condominium Owners Assn. v. Seith, supra,
159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 577-578.) On the record before this court, we
cannot find that the imposition of a 30-day minimum lease term is
unreasonable. The provision applies to all owners who rent their Homes,
the restriction does not violate public policy (see, e.g., City of Oceanside v. McKenna (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1420,
1426-1427 [restrictions requiring owner occupancy and forbidding the
leasing of units were reasonable in view of the city's redevelopment
goals of providing a stabilized community of owner-occupied units for
low and moderate income persons]), and any burden to enforce the
minimum lease term is outweighed by its beneficial value in preserving
the residential character of the development.
With cursory argument and no citation to any legal authority, Pheil
contends the Amendment is unreasonable because it grants the
Association the right to evict tenants for breach of the CC&R's and
to impose attorney fees and costs onto the owner. "[E]very brief should
contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points
made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat
it as waived and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]" (9
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 594, p. 627.) Although
we may deem this point waived, we note the Association addressed it on
the merits. fn. 2
[3] The Association argues this provision is reasonable. First, the
Association notes that associations have been analogized to landlords
for purposes of determining tort liability. (Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490,
499-501.) As such, if an association is held to a landlord's
obligations, it should equally benefit from any rights attributed to
the landlord. We agree. Second, the Association argues that any tenant
should be bound by the CC&R's to the same extent that the homeowner
is bound. In the event the homeowner fails [166 Cal.App.4th 797]
or refuses to take effective measures to assure his or her tenant is
complying with the CC&R's, the Association needs some means to
assure compliance. We agree. Third, according to the Association, the
enforcement remedies apply to any and all tenants in breach of the
CC&R's, and providing the Association with the right to enforce any
breach of the CC&R's does not violate public policy. (See, e.g., 1
Sproul & Rosenberry, Advising Cal. Common Interest Communities
(Cont.Ed.Bar. 2007) § 6.45, pp. 423-424.) Again, we agree. Nonetheless,
in his reply brief, Pheil claims that commentators have criticized
provisions allowing associations the right to enforce the CC&R's
against tenants as being "unlawful." Reviewing the practice tip
referenced by Pheil, we note the commentators merely caution
practitioners to consider the risks involved. Specifically, an
association may be liable for wrongful eviction given the fact that the
association does not have possession of the property, and thus, is not
the rightful party to bring the action. (Id. at pp. 424-425.)
[4] For the above reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Amendment to be reasonable.
IV. DID THE BALLOTING CONFORM WITH THE CC&R'S?
[5] According to Pheil, subdivision (c)(2) of section 1356 was not
complied with because the letter that accompanied the ballot
inaccurately portrayed the context of the Amendment and made improper
reference to the ineffective rule. In response, the Association argues
it complied with the procedures for amending the CC&R's as governed
by section 1363.03. According to that section, a secret ballot
procedure must be used with a double envelope system, inspectors of the
election must be appointed, and the results must be tabulated at a
board meeting. (§ 1363.03, subds. (c) & (e).) Here, the Association
maintains it mailed the Amendment, the ballot, voting instructions, and
two envelopes to each of its members. Furthermore, the results were
tabulated at the board meeting.
The Amendment clearly indicated the language to be added and the
language to be deleted. Presenting the owners with a redlined version
of the proposed amendment constituted the reasonably detailed form the
CC&R's require. While Pheil claims the cover letter accompanying
the ballot and other documents misled the owners, we note there is no
evidence in the record that supports this claim. Not one owner
submitted a declaration claiming he or she voted in a particular way
solely due to the information contained in the cover letter. Moreover,
as the Association points out, the [166 Cal.App.4th 798]
cover letter highlighted the fact that the Amendment would provide for
a 30-day minimum leasing requirement and the ability of the Association
to evict tenants. fn. 3
Notwithstanding the above, Pheil claims the Association failed to give
notice of the election results pursuant to section 1363.03, subdivision
(g). That section provides, "The tabulated results of the election
shall be promptly reported to the board of directors of the association
and shall be recorded in the minutes of the next meeting of the board
of directors and shall be available for review by members of the
association. Within 15 days of the election, the board shall publicize
the tabulated results of the election in a communication directed to
all members." The Association does not claim that it gave notice of the
election results; however, it does claim the results were reported at
the Board meeting on November 15, 2006, and recorded in the minutes of
the Board meeting (which are available to each member). Thus, the
Association argues that it provided the required notice to its members,
but even if it had not, the petition was not precluded. We agree with
the Association.
Pheil does not oppose the results of the election. Rather, he opposes
the Amendment itself. Pheil does not provide any argument or legal
citation to any authority as to the consequences which the Association
should suffer given its failure to comply with section 1363.03,
subdivision (g). Under the circumstances of this case, we find such
failure to be trivial. Accordingly, we cannot agree that such failure
should result in precluding the Association from proceeding with its
petition. Moreover, we cannot find that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to find that the balloting did not comply with
the CC&R's.
V. DOES THE AMENDMENT IMPAIR THE
SECURITY INTEREST OF MORTGAGEES?
In his final contention, Pheil argues that the CC&R's require
approval of 51 percent of first mortgagees who have previously
requested notification [166 Cal.App.4th 799]
under two stated circumstances, namely, where any amendment affects the
rights or protection granted to mortgagees and where any amendment
could result in a mortgage being canceled by forfeiture. He claims the
Association failed to give such notice and to obtain such approval.
Again, we note that Pheil fails to support his claim with any legal
argument with citation of authorities on the points made. His brief
reference to section 1356, subdivision (e)(3), is insufficient.
Nonetheless, given the fact that the Association addressed the merits
of the issue, so will we.
[6] Section 1356, subdivision (e)(3), forbids the court from approving
any amendment to CC&R's that impairs the security interest of a
mortgagee, if approval of a specified percentage of the mortgagees is
required under the CC&R's. According to Article XIII, Section
13.2.2 of the CC&R's, the following amendments require 51 percent
approval of the first mortgagees: "(a) Any amendment which affects or
purports to affect the validity or priority of Mortgages or the rights
or protection granted to Mortgagees, insurers or guarantors of first
Mortgages. [¶] (b) Any amendment which would require a Mortgagee after
it has acquired a Lot through foreclosure to pay more than its
proportionate share of any unpaid Assessment or Assessments accruing
before such foreclosure. [¶] (c) Any amendment which would or could
result in a Mortgage being canceled by forfeiture, or in a Lot not
being separately assessed for tax purposes. [¶] (d) Any amendment
relating to (i) the insurance provisions in Article VIII, (ii) the
application of insurance proceeds in Article IX, or (iii) the
disposition of any money received in any taking under condemnation
proceedings. [¶] (e) Any amendment which would subject any Owner to a
right of first refusal or other such restriction, if such Lot is
proposed to be transferred." The Amendment does not fall under any item
in this list.
In his reply brief, Pheil claims the temporal restriction on renting
"clearly impacts the ability of owners to pay their mortgages."
However, Mission Shores is a residential development. Pheil has not
provided any evidence to the contrary. Other than his claim that he was
told he could lease or rent his home and that he thereafter on occasion
rented it to others, there is no evidence that he needed to borrow
money to purchase his home, that he obtained a non-owner occupied loan,
or that he purchased his home with sole purpose of renting it out to
pay the mortgage.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that there was no impairment to the security interests of
mortgagees. [166 Cal.App.4th 800]
VI. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The Association is entitled to its costs on appeal.
Ramirez, P.J., and King, J., concurred.
FN 1. All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
FN 2.
The Association argues that this issue is waived because Pheil failed
to raise it in his written opposition. While the Association discounts
the fact that Pheil did raise the issue during oral argument before the
trial court, we do not.
FN 3.
The cover letter provided, in part, the following: "The Association's
[CC&R's] currently discuss[] rental of residences in a very broad
manner. There are few protections afforded to the Owners against
tenants who treat the Association not as their personal home, but
instead as a weekend party place. . . . [¶] Enclosed is a proposed
amendment of Article II, Section 2.1, . . . The purpose of the proposed
amendment is to further define the rights and obligations of Owners who
rent or lease their residences. Among other things and consistent with
the current Rules and Regulations, the proposed amendment places a
thirty (30) day minimum on any lease and provides the Association with
the right, but not the obligation, to evict problem tenants on an
Owner's behalf if the Owner refuses to take corrective action."