Legislative Terminology
Ranking of Laws. 
The three sources of law are constitutional, statutory, and case law. The sources are ranked as follows: first, constitutional; second, statutory; and third, case law.
Laws & Ordinances. Bills (proposed changes to the law) are introduced into the legislature in Sacramento. Once a bill has been approved by both houses of the legislature (the Assembly and Senate) and signed by the Governor, a bill becomes a statute or "statutory law." The Davis-Stirling Act (Civ. Code §§ 4000-6150) is an example of statutory law. Regulatory laws are adopted by executive agencies based on statutes. Ordinances are passed by counties and cities.
Enrolled. A bill that passes both houses is sent for proofreading for consistency before being sent to the Governor for approval.
Transmitted to Governor. The governor must sign or veto legislation within ten days after transmittal, or it becomes law without his/her signature. For bills transmitted after session adjournment, the governor must act within 30 days after the end of the session, or the legislation becomes law without being signed.
Chaptered. A bill is "chaptered" once it is signed by the Governor. It becomes law on January 1 of the following year unless it contains an urgency clause (takes effect immediately) or specifies an effective date.
CAI-CLAC. For more information about bills, see the California Legislative Action Committee's website.
2025 Legislation Affecting HOAs
AB 21. Association Management and Meeting Procedures. (DIED in Committee) This bill would have amended the Davis-Stirling Act to:
- Require notice of proposed rule changes to be sent by individual notice instead of general notice.
- Prevent a majority of the board from communications outside of a meeting regarding association business.
- Require open meeting agendas to include the wording of proposed motions and resolutions.
- Require the board to announce litigation matters at the next meeting.
- Require the board to announce at meetings whether any insurance claims were filed.
- Require executive session minutes to include the case name of any litigation matter discussed.
- Require electronic recording (audio or audio and video) of open session meetings and the recordings would be made available to members.
- Require specific information to be included in open board meeting minutes, including the names of members who speak at the meetings, the rationale for board actions and decisions, and a summary of major arguments, statements that support board directors following fiduciary duties.
- Allows members to recover court costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred for consulting an attorney to bring an action for violation of the Open Meeting Act if the member prevails.
- Require changes to be made to Election Rules regarding not denying ballots to members and persons acting under a power of attorney.
- Allows members to recover court costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred for consulting an attorney to bring an action for violation of the inspection of association’s records statutes if the member prevails.
AB 69. FAIR Plan Renewal. (DIED in Committee) This bill would require insurance brokers to determine if a California FAIR Plan Association policy can be moved to a voluntary market insurer before renewal. Under this bill, the broker of record must use their knowledge of the voluntary market to assess if a policy can be moved. This bill will allow policyholders, before renewal, an opportunity to obtain coverage from a voluntary insurer if available.
AB 130. Fines. (CHAPTERED) This bill proposes to amend Civil Code §§ 5850 and 5855 concerning disciplinary action against association members. The bill proposes to place a cap on the amount of fines that can be imposed for governing document violations to $100 per violation or any lesser amount set forth in a fine schedule. The bill also gives members the opportunity to cure violations before a board meeting where the board is considering imposing disciplinary action. Boards will not be able to impose discipline if the member cures the violation before the meeting or if curing the violation would take longer than the time between the notice of the hearing and the meeting, the member provides financial commitment to cure the violation.
AB 739. Managing Agent Licensing. (DIED in Committee) This bill would add Civil Code § 5378 to the Davis-Stirling Act and would require that a “managing agent” of a common interest development hold a California real estate broker license.
AB 1154. Junior Accessory Dwelling Units. (CHAPTERED) This bill proposes to amend Government Code § 66333 to require owner-occupancy of a single-family residence in which a junior accessory dwelling unit (JADU) is permitted only if the JADU will share a bathroom in the existing structure. It also proposes to require that rental of a JADU be for a term longer than 30 days.
SB 282. Residential Heat Pump Systems: Water Heaters and HVAC: Installations. (DIED in Committee) This bill proposes to add new Civil Code § 4737 to invalidate governing document provisions that prevent the replacement of a fuel-gas-burning appliance with an electric appliance. The bill would also invalidate governing document provisions that effectively prohibit or restrict the installation or use of a residential heat pump water heater or heat pump heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system.
SB 410. Disclosures To Prospective Purchasers: Exterior Elevated Elements Inspection. (CHAPTERED) This bill proposes to amend Civil Code §§ 4525 and 4528 to require that the most recent exterior elevated elements inspection report performed under Civil Code § 5551 be provided to prospective purchasers. This bill also proposes to amend Civil Code § 5551 to require the first page of the exterior elevated elements inspection report to include additional information, including the total number of exterior elevated elements in the condominium project, and the number inspected. The bill also clarifies that Section 5551 applies to buildings containing three or more attached multifamily dwelling units. Further, the bill proposes to amend Civil Code §§ 5200 and 5210 to include the Section 5551 reports into the definition of “association records” that members are entitled to inspect, and would require that all such inspection reports be subject to inspection for two inspection cycles.
SB 546. Accounting: Board Review of Financials. (DIED in Committee) This bill proposes to delete Civil Code § 5501, which allows the board or a subcommittee of the board to review specified financial documents (i.e., account statements, reconciliations, and ledgers) independent of a board meeting and to ratify the review at a subsequent board meeting.
SB 547. Commercial Property Insurance Cancellation and Nonrenewal. (CHAPTERED) This bill adds new Insurance Code § 675.55 and prevents insurance companies from canceling or refusing to renew commercial property insurance policies for any property located within or adjacent to a fire perimeter where a wildfire has occurred for one year after the declaration of a state of emergency, based solely on the fact that the insured structure is located in an area in which a wildfire has occurred. The statute states that it applies to commercial insurance policies covering homeowners associations, condominium associations, and condominium complexes.
SB 570. DS Act Title – Non-Substantive Change. (DIED in Committee) This bill would amend Civil Code §4000 to make a non-substantive change to the provision specifying the act’s title.
SB 625. Housing Developments: Disasters: Reconstruction of Destroyed or Damaged Structures. (CHAPTERED) This bill proposes to add Civil Code § 4752 to the Davis-Stirling Act and states that any governing document provision that prohibits or includes conditions that have the effect of prohibiting reconstruction of a residential structure that was destroyed or damaged in a disaster is void and unenforceable. Any owner who prevails in bringing an action to enforce Section 4752 shall be awarded reasonable attorneys fees. This bill also proposes to add Civil Code § 4766 to add specific procedures for architectural review of any application for the reconstruction of a residential structure that was destroyed or damaged in a disaster, including that applications must be reviewed and decided upon within 30 days of submission.
SB 677. Lot Splits. (DIED in Committee. Note: Will be up for reconsideration next year) This bill proposes to amend Civil Code § 4751 to prevent governing documents from prohibiting housing developments and urban lot splits that receive ministerial approval.
SB 770. EV Charging Station. (CHAPTERED) Current laws set various requirements for installing and using electric vehicle (EV) charging stations in a common area or an exclusive use common area of a CID. One such requirement is that the owner must provide a certificate of insurance that names the association as an additional insured party. This bill would remove the requirement for the insurance policy to include the association as an additional insured party. It would also fix an erroneous cross-reference regarding the amount of that insurance.
SB 811. Document Delivery. (DIED in Committee) This bill proposes to make non-substantive changes to Civil Code § 4050 relating to document delivery by mail and electronic means.
2025 HOA Case Law
Case Law Defined. Case law is created by judicial decisions in California's appellate courts and supreme court. Statutory law demands or prohibits certain acts. Case law interprets statutory law. The cases also explain how the justices arrived at their particular conclusions. If published, their rulings serve as precedence for cases that follow.
11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners' Association v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. During the reroofing of the HOA’s building, two rainstorms penetrated the partially constructed roof causing extensive interior damage. The HOA made a claim under its condominium policy. The insurance company denied the claim, concluding that the losses resulted from a water nonaccidental faulty workmanship which was not covered under the policy. The HOA filed suit, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment finding that the policy did not cover the HOA’s losses because a water damage exclusion and faulty workmanship exclusion applied. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that there were triable issues of material fact as to whether the coverage exclusions in the “all risks” policy applied. The insurance company failed to show that the alleged negligence by the contractor was the sole cause of the HOA’s losses. Notably, the insurance company introduced no evidence that the roof repairs could have been done in a way that would have fully protected the property in the event of a rainstorm. On July 9, 2025, the California Supreme Court granted a petition for review of this case.
Applegate v. Carrington Foreclosure Services. The property in this case was won for $100 at a trustee sale by the trust beneficiary. Civ. Code section 2924m states that if the property is purchased at a trustee sale by a non-prospective owner-occupant, the property will not be deemed sold until 15 days after the auction if no eligible bidders submit a bid. Here, a prospective owner-occupant entered a bid after the auction but before the 15-day period had run; however, by that time, the trustee canceled and unwound the sale under the beneficiary's direction. The prospective owner-occupant sought the court to compel the trustee to sell him the property, however the court found that the prospective owner-occupant (1)entered the bid after it was unwound, (2) did not comply with the statutes requirements for bids and notices of bid and (3) could not prove he was a prospective owner-occupant as the phrase is defined in the statute because he lacked an affidavit or declaration. For these reasons, the court found that the prospective owner-occupant bidder was not entitled to the property under Civ. Code section 2924m and decided this case against the prospective owner-occupant as a matter of law.
Arroyo v. Pac. Ridge Neighborhood Homeowners Assn’n. The plaintiff brought suit against her HOA and the inspector of elections (IOE) regarding an election that resulted in her being recalled from the HOA’s board. Plaintiff claimed that the candidate statement issued with the ballot on the recall was considered a form of “association media” under Civil Code § 5105(a). The IOE denied the plaintiff’s request to include in the ballot mailing a statement. The IOE denied the request because the plaintiff was not a candidate for re-election if the recall was successful. The court of appeals analyzed the langue of Civil Code § 5105(a) and determined that the term “media” encompassed the HOA’s notice of the recall election as well as the candidate statement. The court also looked at the definition of “advocate” under the same statute and determined that the candidate statement was a form of advocating. The court held that since the candidate statement was mailed to all the homeowners, under CC 5105(a), the HOA had an obligation to provide plaintiff with “equal access” to the HOA’s media so she could advocate her point of view for purposes reasonably related to the recall election.
The plaintiff also asserted enough votes had been cast against the recall to block it under Corp Code 7222(b)(1). The court looked at the language of Section 7222(b)(1) regarding “votes cast against removal, or not consenting in writing to the removal. . .” Plaintiff argued that “not consenting to writing to the removal” refers to members who do not vote at all, not just members who participated in the vote but abstained. The trial court interpreted the statute to mean that the phrase "or not consenting in writing to the removal" refers to either to votes (1) against removal or (2) votes "not consenting in writing to the removal" such as abstentions (i.e., ballots received with no vote). The appellate court didn’t squarely answer how Section 7222(b)(1) should be interpreted, but did note that a leading treatise has characterized the application of Section 7222(b)(1) as “badly worded” and “somewhat complex.” The court agreed, stating: “The Legislature should provide clarity on this issue, particularly given the proliferation of common interest development communities governed by directors.”
Bird Rock Home Mortgage, LLC v. Breaking Ground, LP. This case held that Civil Code § 2924m’s extended bidding period applies to nonjudicial foreclosure sales of HOA assessment liens. The court explained that such liens function like mortgages. Under section 2924m, if the winning bidder is not a natural person who will occupy the property as a primary residence, the sale does not become final immediately; instead, there is an extension of up to 45 days during which eligible bidders may submit higher or equal bids. The Appeals Court further clarified that this extension period operates in tandem with Civil Code § 5715. This means that the 90-day redemption period for HOA assessment foreclosures does not begin until a qualified bid is submitted within the extension period.
Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider. A developer of an HOA filed a cross-complaint against a timeshare owner of a unit, stemming from the timeshare owner's alleged breach of his settlement contract in an earlier lawsuit. The earlier lawsuit was a class-action lawsuit brought by the owner regarding management and the use of units. The timeshare owner filed an anti-SLAPP motion, stating that the cross-complaint was based on the exercise of the owner’s constitutional right to petition the courts and to free speech.. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the timeshare owners' communication and filing of the lawsuit fell within their First Amendment right, as the matter was of public concern to the community. Furthermore, the court found that the developer failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. An interesting issue in the case was the developer’s claim that the owner contracted himself out of being able to bring an anti-SLAPP motion due to a nondisparagement clause in the settlement agreement of the prior lawsuit. The court rejected this argument, holding that the nondisparagement clause did not amount to a waiver of all protection under anti-SLAPP.
C.R. v. PLB Mgmt, LLC. Represented by his mother, plaintiff C.R., who has severe autism, sued PLB Management for violations of the Fair Housing Act and California’s Disabled Persons Act. PLB rejected his mother’s request to reserve a parking spot for them in front of their apartment for her exclusive use to accommodate C.R’s disability-related needs. PLB only offered a reserved parking spot farther away from their apartment. A jury found that this was not a reasonable accommodation. However, the District Court overturned the jury, ruling that there was no legally sufficient evidence that PLB caused C.R. any harm. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. C.R.’s mother presented sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that C.R. experienced emotional distress caused by PLB’s actions. Although C.R. did not provide personal testimony since he is nonverbal, his mother competently testified on his behalf. The Appellate Court noted that causation can also be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Thus, the Appellate Court remanded the case back to the District Court for a new trial.
Eng v. Opperman. Homeowners applied to the HOA to build an ADU. The design review committee stated that it lacked expertise in ADUs and formally referred ADU applications to the board. The board investigated by retaining an independent consultant and requesting the homeowners separate the ADU and garage components into distinct applications (which they refused). The HOA then denied the proposal, citing traffic and fire safety concerns related to the new garage’s location and configuration near common-area access. The homeowners sued for breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and declaratory relief. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the HOA, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the board had acted within its authority under the governing documents and applicable law. The court applied the business judgment principles. The homeowners' failure to produce substantial evidence of bad faith, fraud, or arbitrary decision-making was insufficient to overcome deference to the board’s good faith decisions.
Nabatmama v. Ross Morgan & Co. The HOA imposed fines over $106,000.00 against the plaintiff for CC&R violations. Plaintiff filed suit against the HOA’s property management company for trying to collect - arguing violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss because violations and the imposition of fines are not consensual by either party and are not transactions that arise from the initial purchase of the property. The FDCPA is limited to debts that arise from consensual transactions between negotiating parties (i.e. when you promise to pay assessments when purchasing property with an HOA). Thus, HOA fines are not debt for the purposes of the FDCPA.
Ridley v. Rancho Palma Grande Homeowners Ass'n. The crawl space beneath the plaintiff’s condominium flooded due to a well that was not destroyed prior to the development of the property. The trial court found the HOA and its president grossly negligent and thus in breach of their duties. They appealed, arguing there was not substantial evidence of a breach. The Appeals Court upheld the trial court’s decision, that there was a breach as they acted in bad faith and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Initially, the HOA agreed with the city, water district, contractors, and its law firm that the flood was likely caused by an undestroyed well. However, they changed positions, ignored expert opinion, failed to mitigate damages, rejected every proposal/method to locate the well, stopped searching, and without any basis claimed the water was from a high-water table. The well was only discovered by accident when the HOA hired workers to dig out and fill a sinkhole that appeared. In the end the damage was severe, more than nineteen (19) months had passed before the HOA removed the water and made any meaningful repairs. Thus, there was substantial evidence showing bad faith and a failure to conduct a reasonable investigation.
Ruffier v. Volcano Hills Rd. Maint. Ass'n. A quorum was reached and a majority of the votes were in favor to eliminate the governing document’s $200 limit for the annual assessment. A month later, the board voted to raise the annual assessment from $200 to $1,000. Plaintiff member sued, arguing that the amendment to eliminate the $200 limit was void and that the board’s assessment increase was void as well. The trial court upheld the increase, concluding the $200 cap was unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that even if the governing documents imposed no cap on assessments, any increase must comply with Civil Code section 5605. Section 5605 requires either compliance with the annual budget disclosure requirements of section 5300 or approval of a majority of a quorum of the membership for increases over 20% of the prior year’s assessment. Because the HOA did neither, the board lacked authority to impose the increase. The assessment increase was therefore void.
Unpublished Cases
The following cases are unpublished opinions and are not binding precedents. However, they give insight into how future courts might deal with similar issues.
Calusian v. Alpine Meadows Homeowners Ass’n. Sadly, Kevin Tahmasebi died in a condominium garage fire at the Alpine Meadows Homeowners Association. Kevin’s wife and daughter sued the association for negligence and premises liability. The CC&Rs stated the garage was common area, and the association is solely responsible for common area maintenance, repair, and replacement. The association argued it did not owe plaintiffs a duty of care since they were not owners. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s granting of a summary judgment motion in favor of the association. The Court determined that the association owed a general duty of ordinary care to both owners and non-owners who entered areas under their control. Additionally, the association failed to establish it lacked notice of dangerous conditions or problems with the common area. The only evidence was that the owner and tenants (plaintiffs) had never complained of any such issues. Thus, the case was sent back down to the trial court.
Daniels v. Oakmont Vill. Ass’n. Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, filed a Federal case against an HOA, alleging that his rights under Title I of the Civil Rights Act were violated because he was not allowed to vote in the HOA’s election. The plaintiff was a tenant in the HOA, which is why he wasn’t allowed to vote. The plaintiff asserted that this constitutes socioeconomic discrimination. The court found that Title I of the Civil Rights Act bars the unequal application of voter registration requirements but does not apply to elections within private organizations, such as an HOA. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that any amendment to this complaint likely futile.
Del Mar Woods v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. This case began with an underlying lawsuit brought by a member against the HOA. Before filing the lawsuit, the member emailed the HOA about excessive noise from their upstairs neighbor. The HOA took steps to address the situation. However, the situation escalated, and the member’s attorney sent a demand letter to the HOA. The day after receiving the attorney’s demand letter, the HOA made a claim under Defendant’s claims-made insurance policy. The Defendant insurance company refused to defend the HOA in the lawsuit. The HOA filed this suit in federal court, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The insurance company argued the claim was rightfully denied because the emails sent by the member constituted a “demand” received by the HOA before the policy’s effective date. The court did not agree, finding the member’s email did not sufficiently communicate to the HOA that they were making a demand. Since the policy did not define what constituted a “demand” the court used the plain meaning of the word, supported by case law. The email failed to insist on a specific course of action based on an asserted right, identify potential claims against the HOA, express a clear intent or threat to commence suit, or provide an ultimatum that constituted a demand. Thus, the court granted the HOA’s motion for summary judgment, which ruled the insurance company breached its duty to defend the HOA in the underlying suit.
Forbush v. Hamilton Cove Homeowners Ass'n. The HOA, a condominium development on Catalina Island, denied the Plaintiffs' requests for major construction to their units. Plaintiffs proposed an exterior elevator, a desalinization unit, and more that would depend on converting common area containing utility pipes into a hallway. The exterior elevator was denied for aesthetic concerns because it would alter the appearance of the building. The request for a desalinization unit was denied because of the negative effects on the saltwater circulation system of the development. The hallway was denied because it was common area which would require membership approval to convert it into exclusive use common area. The Court found the HOA acted reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously, when denying the requests.
Hoang v. Villageway Management, Inc. Plaintiff’s property was sold in a foreclosure sale due to unpaid assessments. Foreclosure sales are presumed to be conducted normally and fairly. However, this presumption can be refuted by showing a failure to follow the required procedures which caused prejudice to the person challenging the foreclosure sale. Prejudice means it impaired the person’s ability to protect their property interest. Here, Plaintiff did not show any prejudice in the foreclosure process. Although there were technical errors such as stating Plaintiff owned the property as an unmarried woman, but he is a man, Plaintiff failed to prove how the technical errors prejudiced him. Thus, the foreclosure sale was properly conducted.
Holcomb v. Aliso Villas Condo. Ass'n. Plaintiff homeowner alleged that water intrusion and the Association’s remediation efforts caused “injury to his health and the complete loss of all use and enjoyment of his home.” The trial court granted the Association’s motion for nonsuit because the plaintiff failed to provide necessary expert testimony. His only expert, a mycologist, admitted he lacked the qualifications to address construction-related issues. A plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish a prima facie case when the subject matter requires specialized knowledge beyond the understanding of laypersons. This requirement is especially critical in negligence claims involving professional services, where expert testimony defines the applicable standard of care. In this case, the plaintiff offered no qualified expert, so he could not establish the standard of care or show any breach. Plaintiff claimed the Association failed to properly remediate the property, address ventilation failures and foundation leaks, implement comprehensive preventative measures, and that it performed ineffective mitigation efforts that led to additional water leaks over the following two years. He further claimed these failures exacerbated hazardous conditions. However, without expert testimony, the jury could not reasonably evaluate any of these allegations. Thus, nonsuit was appropriate and was affirmed by the appellate court.
Holmby Westood Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Focus. Defendant, an experienced residential developer bought a separate interest within this planned development HOA. The separate interest had an old dilapidated house, which the defendant demolished and built a new, much larger house. The original deed to the defendant’s property contained certain restrictions, including setback requirements for the front and side yards. The deed restrictions were supposed to expire in 1976. The HOA was formed prior to the expiration of the deed restrictions, and the HOA at the time got some of the owners to consent to extend the deed restrictions and reaffirm the right of the HOA to enforce them, including the then owners of defendant’s property. While the defendant constructed the new home, the HOA repeatedly warned the defendant that the new house violated the setback restrictions. The company argued that the provision should not apply, as 30 of the 80 lots contained in the tract did not sign the 1975 extension and should not be subject to the Association’s enforcement provisions. The Court found that the defendant was bound to abide by the Association’s rules and regulations because the prior property owners of the lot signed the 1975 extension, and the purpose of the agreement to maintain uniformity for the benefit of the neighborhood still existed. The Court ordered the company to remove or modify the new home to comply with the setback provision.
Johnson v. Raven Wood Homeowners Ass'n. Plaintiff alleged the HOA violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) when it denied his request for a reasonable accommodation to attend the 2022 annual meeting remotely by Zoom. Plaintiff asked to attend remotely due to the global pandemic and the potential impacts it may have to his health. As part of the emailed request, his doctor noted his need for remote attendance. The HOA’s response was that he could come set up a zoom if he wanted and they lacked equipment. Plaintiff requested to attend through the mobile app without the need for additional equipment. The HOA claimed the request was burdensome and unreasonable because of limited resources, the small size of the board, difficulty finding volunteers to serve on the board, and the rural location with limited internet and cellular service. The HOA moved for summary judgment. Under the FHA, plaintiffs must show (1) they have disabilities, (2) that defendants knew or reasonably should have known of those disabilities, (3) an accommodation may be (or is) necessary to ensure an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, (4) the accommodation is reasonable, and (5) that defendants refused to make the requested accommodation. The HOA’s motion was denied because genuine issues of material facts exist. There are facts in dispute on whether Plaintiff had a disability and thus whether the HOA reasonably should have known or did know about the disability. Further, a reasonable fact finder could give credit to either; the HOA’s claim the request was unreasonable and burdensome or Plaintiff’s claim it was reasonable. Lastly, the HOA’s unwillingness to conduct the meeting remotely or arrange meetings at a location with better cell and internet service could be reasonably inferred as a denial. Although this case is from the Western District of Washington, it is illustrative of how a federal district court in the 9th Circuit ruled on a FHA claim.
Karkaletsis v. Hesperia Green Estates Homeowners' Ass'n. Defendant is a planned development of residential homes intended to be developed in eight phases. However, only phases one, two, and three were completed. The lots in phase four remained undeveloped and were sold to a corporation by the City of San Bernardino at a tax sale in 1997. Tax deeds conveyed title free of all encumbrances existing before the sale, with an exception for easements, servitudes, and restrictions (e.g. CC&Rs). In 2001, Plaintiff bought two phase four lots from the corporation. In 2014, the HOA attempted to annex the phase four lots. Plaintiff learned of the HOA only after he received notices in 2015. Plaintiff argued the lots were not subject to the HOA’s CC&Rs. Both the trial court and Court of Appeal held the annexation attempt failed because the HOA did not satisfy the CC&Rs’ terms and conditions of annexation before the tax sale. Therefore, the tax deeds of phase four lots passed title without being subject to the HOA’s CC&Rs.
Kruschen v. Annandale Townhouse Ass'n. Plaintiff member sued alleging that the HOA did not comply with election rules in a board of director election. The trial court found most violations were de minimis and did not affect the election outcome, except for one: the inspector of elections accepted, commingled, and counted fifty ballots after the polls closed. The HOA’s election rules required that only ballots received before the close of polls be counted, and the election notice stated mailed ballots had to be received by the inspector no later than the day before the election meeting. Although the board had authority to extend the ballot deadline, it did not do so. After the inspector announced the polls were closed and determined a quorum was not met, the meeting was adjourned to allow a reconvened meeting with a lower quorum. The inspector nevertheless retrieved additional mailed ballots the next day and counted them. The trial court invalidated the election, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the polls had closed before the additional ballots were received and that the board never authorized an extension of the ballot deadline. Because the untimely ballots were commingled with valid ballots and could not be segregated, the HOA failed to show the violation did not affect the election results. The court therefore affirmed invalidation of the election.
Larson v. Hsu. The parties owned neighboring homes in Palos Verdes Estates, with the plaintiffs’ property situated behind the defendant’s and separated from the ocean by it. The HOA’s CC&Rs included provisions on landscaping, view preservation rules, and required Art Jury approval for certain projects or changes. Defendant rebuilt his home with approval to plant a prunus caroliniana hedge, maintained at six (6) feet. Instead, he planted a fast-growing ficus hedge. It eventually grew to be 10–20 feet at certain points, blocking plaintiffs’ second-story ocean view. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the defendant, finding that the plaintiffs had no protected view right since no second story (and thus no ocean view) existed in 1923 (the date used to define view rights under the HOA’s CC&Rs). However, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Art Jury provision requiring adherence to approved landscaping operates independently of the view protections. Thus, a triable issue existed as to whether the defendant’s ficus hedge violated that provision. The case was sent back to the trial court for further proceedings.
Lipton v. Fairbanks Ranch Ass'n. Plaintiff’s neighbors removed a bamboo hedge screening their tennis court in order to repair a retaining wall. The plaintiffs complained to the HOA about the unscreened tennis court and its lights. For several years, the HOA failed to require the neighbors to install adequate screening. Plaintiffs sued the HOA, claiming it violated the governing documents. The HOA asserted that it was not liable under the “judicial deference” principle, which states that where a duly constituted community association board, upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests of the community association and its members, exercises discretion within the scope of its authority under relevant statutes, covenants and restrictions to select among means for discharging an obligation, courts should defer to the board's authority and presumed expertise. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the HOA and stated it was not entitled to judicial deference because the HOA’s governing documents required tennis courts to be naturally screened and lights to be prohibited in most instances. The HOA had discretion in how to address complaints but not to allow violations to persist for years. The HOA’s failure to enforce screening requirements was inconsistent with its governing documents and therefore was not entitled to judicial deference.
Manson v. Fresno Hous. Auth. The plaintiffs lived in a two-story supportive housing building for veterans and people experiencing homelessness, which opened in 2017. The building contained one elevator that was prone to frequent breakdowns lasting about two years until March 2023. Plaintiffs contend the breakdowns trapped them or kept them from their apartments, appointments, and social activities. A third-party vendor maintained the elevator, and the property manager testified that maintenance occurred monthly. The property manager frequently called the vendor about permanent solutions, and the vendor attributed the issues to people tampering with the elevator. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate their mobility disabilities by not repairing the elevator in a timely, sufficient manner. Under the Fair Housing Act and Fair Employment & Housing Act, plaintiffs must show (1) that they have disabilities, (2) that defendants knew or reasonably should have known of those disabilities, (3) that an accommodation may be (or is) necessary to ensure an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, and (4) that defendants refused to provide such an accommodation. The Court found a genuine issue of material fact on whether Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the Plaintiffs’ disabilities: Defendants had paperwork showing one Plaintiff received Social Security for a disability, but it did not reveal the disability’s nature, the same Plaintiff stated on her application to live at the building that she was not disabled, and the property manager testified he saw her walk her dog, use the stairs, and only used the elevator when with one of the other Plaintiffs. As a result, the Court held a jury could find the evidence credible that Defendants did not know the Plaintiff had a disability.
Monndragon v. Bergmann. In 2018, the plaintiff brought a derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant board members, alleging they failed to comply with the HOA’s governing documents and for making unauthorized payments. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion that the trial court granted, as well as their attorneys fees incurred. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the granting of the anti-SLAPP motion and the award of attorney’s fees. In 2022, the plaintiff sold her condominium. Defendants brought a motion to dismiss the case, claiming plaintiff lacked standing. Two days before the motion, the plaintiff requested the Court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The Court granted the request. Defendants then brought a motion for attorney’s fees under the Davis-Stirling Act, which states that the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in actions to enforce the governing documents. The defendant’s attorney’s fee motion included the fees incurred in the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion in full. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the defendants were the prevailing party because the plaintiff did not achieve any relief sought in her complaint. The Court further determined that the defendants were able to include the attorney’s fees incurred in the unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion. The Court reasoned that the defendants were entitled to fees for all of their attorneys’ work in the case, including those associated with the anti-SLAPP motion.
Pittman v. Landsphere Prop. Mgmt. Plaintiff rented a unit in an eight-unit residential apartment building with only four parking spaces assigned to the four largest units. No parking space was designated as handicap accessible, and plaintiff did not have a parking space. Plaintiff is disabled and requested that the defendants create a handicap-accessible parking space for his exclusive use. When defendants denied his request, plaintiff alleged they violated section 3604(f)(3)(B) of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and sought a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to designate and construct one van-accessible parking space reserved for him with permanent striping and signage. Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers "to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a resident] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." The court denied the injunction because constructing a new accessible parking space does not constitute an accommodation of a "rule," "policy," "practice," or "service" under section 3604(f)(3)(B). Such accommodations "generally involve exceptions to existing rules, policies, practices, or services rather than physical changes to property." Here, plaintiff asked for the construction of a new accessible parking space for his exclusive use. Framed that way, the request was a physical modification falling under FHA section 3604(f)(3)(A), which requires the handicapped person to bear the expense of the reasonable accommodation modification. Plaintiff never alleged that he offered to pay for the accessible parking space construction and that defendants refused this accommodation. Thus, the court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint, but granted leave to amend.
Rand-Lewis v. Crestwood Hills Assn. Plaintiff homeowner owned property adjacent to a vacant lot owned by the HOA. Plaintiff bullied, harassed, and yelled at a group of potential buyers who came to inspect the lot. The Association’s legal counsel sent a letter to the Plaintiff, asking him to act civilly and not scream, yell, bully, accost, or shout profanities at potential buyers, visitors, and HOA residents or the HOA will have to take appropriate action. Plaintiff filed suit against the HOA alleging, among other claims, defamation. The HOA filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the complaint. It argued the allegations arose from the HOA’s right to free speech on a matter of public concern and that Plaintiff had no probability of prevailing. The trial court denied the motion, rejecting the arguments. However, the Appeals Court reversed. Holding the letter was protected as a prelitigation communication because it addressed an ongoing dispute, and litigation was seriously contemplated in good faith. Since the speech (letter) was protected, Plaintiff had no viable claim.
Rialto Terrace Homeowners Ass'n v. Superior Court. A 12-year-old boy was severely injured when a tenant’s pit bull bit him while in the garage of an apartment complex. He sued the property owner, property manager, and HOA, under a premises liability negligence claim for failing to protect him from a dangerous dog (the HOA was formed when the property was originally developed, but the complex ended up as a residential rental property). The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that landlords owe no duty to protect others from a tenant’s dog unless they have actual knowledge that the dog is dangerous. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning a jury could infer such knowledge from a maintenance employee’s false deposition testimony denying he had ever seen the dog, along with evidence that the dog had barked, growled, and displayed aggressive behavior before the attack (but this was never reported to the defendants). The Court of Appeal disagreed. It emphasized that a landlord’s duty arises when the landlord actually knows or must have known the dog has dangerous propensities. The court explained that knowledge of a dog’s breed or presence on the property, combined with incidents of barking or aggression that were never reported to the landlord, is insufficient to establish actual knowledge, as was the case here. It further held that a false exculpatory statement alone, cannot establish actual knowledge without affirmative evidence showing the dog’s dangerous behavior was obvious. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
Slotkin v. Ten Five Sixty Wilshire Condo. Ass'n. Defendants, including the HOA, ceased providing Plaintiff with bellman services at the condominium complex where she resides. Defendants provided other tenants in the luxury condominium complex with bellman services, which included assistance with carrying groceries, luggage, and other items to and from residential units. However, they revoked Plaintiff’s bellman services and declined her requests to reinstate them as a reasonable accommodation for her disabilities. What was disputed is whether Plaintiff alleged the requested accommodation was necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling. The appellate court concluded it did. By alleging Defendants provided bellman services "to every resident of the Property except [her]," Plaintiff established how the services were necessary to afford her an equal opportunity of enjoyment.
Tennis Villas at Monarch Beach Homeowners Ass'n v. Ure. Before defendants owned their condominium unit, they rented it. During that rental period, the HOA denied the owner's architectural application. Defendants later acquired title and began unauthorized construction, prompting the HOA to file a lawsuit. The HOA prevailed as the unauthorized construction damaged common areas and the HOA was awarded attorney fees. Defendants appealed the dismissal of their cross-complaint - alleging the prior owner's architectural application was wrongfully denied. However, the Appellate Court affirmed that defendants lacked standing since the cross-complaint was based on a decision made when they were not yet owners. Further, defendants' appealed the award of the attorney fees - claiming ADR was required. This failed since section 5930 does not require ADR when monetary damages exceed the jurisdictional limits. Additionally, section 5960 could limit attorneys fees, but only applies when a party "refuses" to participate in ADR. The defendants never requested ADR, so the HOA couldn't have refused it. Thus, the dismissal of the cross-complaint and attorney fee award were both affirmed.
Trabuco Highland Cmty. Ass'n v. Jennifer Loeffler. After several litigated disputes concerning the collection of delinquent assessments, the homeowner filed a lawsuit against the HOA claiming violations of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The HOA filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that the lawsuit arose from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and the litigation privilege. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion in part, finding that the allegations concerning Rosenthal Act violations arose from protected activity. The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s partial granting of the anti-SLAPP motion, holding that the HOA’s actions arose out of the prior lawsuits and in enforcing the judgment obtained in the prior lawsuits, and therefore constituted protected activity.
ASSISTANCE: Associations needing legal assistance can contact us. To stay current with issues affecting community associations, subscribe to the Davis-Stirling Newsletter.