LAKE FOREST COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
(1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 394
[86 Cal. App. 3d 395]
COUNSEL
Hickey & Neuland and William P. Hickey for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel, and Laurence M. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
KAUFMAN, Acting P.J.
Lake Forest Community Association (Association) instituted this action
against County of Orange (County) to recover ad valorem property taxes
paid under protest. From judgment in favor of County, Association
appeals.
Lake Forest is a planned residential community
development (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 11003) located in an
unincorporated portion of southern Orange County. The homes and the lots
on which they are built are
[86 Cal. App. 3d 397] individually
owned. Recreational and common-use areas are commonly owned. Many of the
homes do not have traditional backyards or recreational areas.
Association is an "owners association" (see Bus. & Prof. Code, §
11003.1) organized as a nonprofit California corporation to operate and
maintain for the benefit of its members the recreational facilities and
common areas and to enforce a recorded declaration of covenants,
conditions and restrictions within Lake Forest.
Its membership
consists exclusively of homeowners within Lake Forest, and homeowner
membership in the Association is mandatory. Association's income is
derived solely from annual assessment of the membership and fees charged
for the use of certain of the facilities to defray the expenses
involved. All of Association's income is expended solely for the
operation of the Association and the maintenance and care of its
property for the benefit of its members. Association is tax exempt under
both the Internal Revenue Code and the California Revenue and Taxation
Code.
One of the common-use facilities in Lake Forest is a
clubhouse, and title to the clubhouse is held by Association. The
clubhouse is located on a separate assessor's parcel. However, pursuant
to Revenue and Taxation Code section 2188.5, the real property taxes
levied against the clubhouse and the parcel of land on which it is
located are assessed to the separately owned residential properties
owned by Association's members. No natural person nor family resides
within the clubhouse or on the parcel of land on which the clubhouse is
located.
Association also holds title to certain personal
property which was located in and around the clubhouse on March 1, 1975,
the lien date for 1975-1976 property taxes. Illustrative of the nature
of this property are the following items described on exhibit "B"
attached to the stipulation of facts submitted to the trial court: Teen
room equipment, billiard table, pool umbrellas, outside chairs and
lounges, pool furniture, typewriter, pool table, television, card table
and chairs, lounge furniture, bookcase, and folding chairs.
County's assessor assessed this property (hereafter the property or the
assessed property) for fiscal year 1975-1976, and taxes were levied
against Association in the amount of $2,126.50. Association paid the tax
under written protest. After unsuccessfully seeking relief from
County's assessment
[86 Cal. App. 3d 398] appeals board and
seeking a refund, Association filed this action for refund contending
the property was exempt from taxation under the provisions of either
California Constitution, article XIII, section 3, subdivision (m), or
Revenue and Taxation Code section 224 or both. (All further statutory
references will be to the Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise
specified.) The trial court apparently found the assessed property was
not held or used by Association in connection with a trade, profession
or business. It concluded, however, the property was not exempt fn. 1
and rendered judgment for County.
California Constitution,
article XIII, section 3, subdivision (m) (hereafter article XIII,
section 3 (m)), added November 5, 1974, provides: "The following are
exempt from property taxation: [¶] (m) Household furnishings and
personal effects not held or used in connection with a trade,
profession, or business."
Omitting its final paragraph which is
not pertinent, section 224 as last amended in 1974 (Stats. 1974, ch.
311, § 25, p. 598) reads: "The personal effects, household furnishings,
and pets of any person shall be exempt from taxation. [¶] The phrase
'personal effects, household furnishings, and pets' does not include
boats, aircraft, vehicles, or personalty held or used in connection with
a trade, profession or business or pets so held or used."
Association's primary contentions are that the assessed property
qualifies as household furnishings and personal effects within the
meaning of both article XIII, section 3 (m) and section 224 and that
Association is a "person" within the meaning of section 224 so that the
property is both constitutionally and statutorily exempt.
[86 Cal. App. 3d 399]
County concedes the property is of the type that would be exempt if it
were owned by a "householder" and used in a "household." fn. 2 It
contends, however, that (1) article XIII, section 3 (m) and section 224
apply only to the property of "householders" and Association, being a
corporation, is not a "householder" and (2) in order to qualify for the
exemption property must be physically part of a "household" and kept for
household use or purposes and since the assessed property is owned by a
corporation which is incapable of maintaining a household, the assessed
property was not physically a part of a household or kept for household
use or purposes and was, therefore, not exempt.
[1] We have
concluded the property was exempt under section 224; the statutory
language "any person" is sufficiently broad to include Association and
is not restricted to "householders"; to constitute "household
furnishings" it is not necessary that property be physically a part of a
"household," at least in the traditional sense of the word; and, while
County is correct that property must be held for household use or
purposes to qualify as "household furnishings," Association does hold
the assessed property for household use or purposes as those terms are
properly construed. Accordingly, we make no attempt to determine whether
the property might also have been exempt under article XIII, section
3(m) and we discuss that constitutional provision and its predecessor
only to the extent required to explain the legislative history of
section 224. Neither do we find it necessary to consider as a separate
contention Association's argument that the property was exempt because
its beneficial interest is equitably owned by members of the
Association, all of whom are "householders," or to pass upon
Association's contention that the property must be held exempt to avoid
double taxation inasmuch as the right to use the assessed property has
enhanced the assessed value of the homes of Association's members for
purposes of real property taxation.
[86 Cal. App. 3d 400]
County's contention that both article XIII, section 3 (m) and section
224 apply only to "householders" is based on the legislative history of
those provisions and two related sections of the Revenue and Taxation
Code. With respect to section 224, at least, County's analysis of the
legislative history is faulty.
The predecessor of article XIII,
section 3(m) was article XIII, section 10 1/2 added to the California
Constitution November 8, 1904. Commonly referred to as the
"householder's exemption," it provided: "The personal property of every
householder to the amount of $100, the articles to be selected by each
householder, shall be exempt from taxation." (Italics added.)
Following the grant of authority to the Legislature in 1933 to prescribe
personal property tax exemptions by statute, fn. 3 section 210 was
enacted, providing: "The householder's exemption is as specified in
Section 10 1/2 of Article XIII of the Constitution. " (Stats. 1939, ch.
154, § 210, p. 1282.) In 1968, section 210 was amended by the addition
of the language, "If a householder fails to select the personal property
to be exempted, the assessor shall apply the one-hundred-dollar ($100)
exemption to household furnishings and personal effects not otherwise
exempted by law." (Stats. 1969, First Ex. Sess. 1968, ch. 1, § 2, p. 7.)
In the same act (Stats. 1969, First Ex. Sess. 1968, ch. 1, § 5, pp.
8-9) section 224 was enacted, reading: "The personal effects and
household furnishings in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) of every
householder shall be exempt from taxation. [¶] The word 'householder'
means any person owning, purchasing or renting real property which he is
using regularly, if not continuously, as a residence or residences. [¶]
The phrase 'personal effects and household furnishings' does not
include boats, aircraft, vehicles, or personalty held or used in
connection with a trade, profession or business." (Italics added.)
[86 Cal. App. 3d 401]
Thus, it is apparent, as County asserts, that in 1968 article XIII,
section 10 1/2, section 224 and section 210 all applied only to property
of a "householder." Additionally, it is noteworthy that the exemption
prescribed in section 224 was not merely coextensive with, but was in
addition to, the exemption set forth in article XIII, section 10 1/2.
Article XIII, section 10 1/2 exempted all personal property of every
householder up to the amount of $100; section 224 exempted all personal
effects and household furnishings of every householder in excess of
$100. fn. 4
In 1969, section 224 was again amended to eliminate
all references to "householder" and the definition of "householder"
found in the section as amended in 1968. The amended section read: "The
personal effects and household furnishings of any person in excess of
the amount of any exemption allowed to the person on any property
pursuant to Section 10 1/2 of Article XIII of the State Constitution
shall be exempt from taxation. [¶] The phrase 'personal effects and
household furnishings' does not include boats, aircraft, vehicles, or
personalty held or used in connection with a trade, profession or
business." (Italics added.)
County urges that notwithstanding
the elimination of the word "householder" and the substitution therefor
of the words "any person" and the elimination of the statutory
definition of a "householder," section 224 as amended in 1969 must still
be read as referring only to the property of a "householder." Its
argument appears to be that since article XIII, section 10 1/2 applied
only to property of a "householder," the clause "in excess of the amount
of any exemption allowed to the person on any property pursuant to
Section 10 1/2 of Article XIII" (italics added) indicates that the
statutory language "any person" was intended to be limited to a
"householder." We believe not.
In the first place, it is simply
contrary to common sense that the Legislature would go to all the
trouble of deleting all reference in section
[86 Cal. App. 3d 402]
224 to "householder" as well as the definition of "householder"
previously set forth in the section and yet intend that the section
should remain limited in application to the property of a "householder."
Secondly, the interpretation argued for by County is contrary to the
well-established rule of statutory interpretation that it is ordinarily
to be presumed that the Legislature by deleting an express provision of a
statute intended a substantial change in the law. (People v. Valentine,
28 Cal. 2d 121, 142 [169 P.2d 1]; Estate of Todd, 17 Cal. 2d 270, 274-275 [109 P.2d 913]; Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal. App. 2d 511,
524 [332 P.2d 324].) [2] As observed in Valentine: "It has been
repeatedly declared that where changes have been introduced by amendment
it is not to be assumed that they were without design and, further,
that by substantially amending a statute the Legislature demonstrates an
intent to change the preexisting law." (28 Cal.2d at p. 142.)
Moreover, the Legislature was not entirely silent as to the purpose of
the 1969 amendment to section 224. Its purpose was expressed in the act
as follows: "[T]here is nonuniformity in the manner in which assessors
are applying the exemption for personal effects and household
furnishings and in order to avoid confusion and to assure that all
persons in the same circumstances throughout the state will be treated
equally, it is necessary to immediately clarify the intention of the
Legislature in providing the exemption." (Stats. 1969, ch. 88, § 4, p.
212.) (Italics added.)
We are satisfied, therefore, that the
words "in excess of the amount of any exemption allowed to the person on
any property pursuant to Section 10 1/2 of Article XIII" were not
intended to restrict the designation "any person" to a "householder."
Rather, what was intended was that if a $100 exemption were available
under article XIII section 10 1/2 then all personal effects and
household furnishings in excess of $100 would be exempt under section
224 but that if no exemption were provided by article XIII, section 10
1/2, all personal effects and household furnishings would be exempt by
virtue of section 224. As previously noted, the voters were told in the
voter's pamphlet in connection with Proposition 1-a in 1968 that it was
the legislative intention if Proposition 1-a should be approved that
"[t]he property tax on household belongings will be totally eliminated."
(See fn. 4, ante.) Our interpretation of section 224 as amended in 1969
gives effect to that legislative purpose and accords with the
clarification of the legislative intent expressly included in the 1969
amendatory statute.
[86 Cal. App. 3d 403]
[3] Thus, we
are led inexorably to the conclusion that the Legislature intended the
exemption prescribed in section 224 as amended in 1969 to apply to a
class of property--"household furnishings" -- rather than a class of
persons--"householders."
In 1972 section 224 was again amended
to add to the property exempted pets not held or used in connection with
a trade, profession or business; otherwise, no substantive change was
effected. (See Stats. 1972, ch. 4, § 2, p. 4.) So far as the present
case is concerned, the only relevance of the 1972 amendment is its
further demonstration that section 224 was not intended to be
coextensive with article XIII, section 10 1/2.
On November 5,
1974, the voters approved Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 32
(Stats. 1974, res. ch. 70) (hereafter ACA 32) which repealed article
XIII, section 10 1/2 and added article XIII, section 3(m) to the
California Constitution as presently worded. (See text foll. fn. 1,
ante.) Article XIII, section 3(m), of course, makes no reference to
"householder" and simply provides that household furnishings and
personal effects not held or used in connection with a trade, profession
or business are exempt from taxation. (Concomitantly, § 224 was amended
to its present wording.) (Stats. 1974, ch. 311, § 25, p. 598 [see text
foll. fn. 1, ante.].) This latest amendment to section 224 effected no
substantive change but merely rearranged and simplified some of the
statutory language. At the same time section 210 was also amended to
provide: "The householder's exemption is as specified in subdivision (m)
of Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution." (Stats. 1974, ch.
311, § 17, p. 593.) (Italics added.) County urges that notwithstanding
the absence of any reference to "householder" in article XIII, section
3(m), the constitutional exemption nevertheless continues to apply only
to property of a "householder." This argument is based on the fact that
section 210 refers to the exemption provided for in article XIII,
section 3 (m) as "[t]he householder's exemption" (see also § 210.5, fn.
5) and the fact that in the voter's pamphlet distributed by the
Secretary of State in respect to ACA 32, which was Proposition 8 on the
November 5, 1974, ballot, in the argument in favor of the proposition it
was stated that it was not the purpose of the
[86 Cal. App. 3d 404]
amendment to make a change in the existing tax structure. fn. 6
Inasmuch as we have concluded that the exemption prescribed in section
224 is not limited to "householders," and in view of the fact that the
exemption provided in section 224 has never been coextensive with the
constitutional exemption, we find it unnecessary to determine whether
the constitutional exemption as presently worded applies only to the
property of a "householder" notwithstanding that the word "householder"
is not included in its language. We do agree, however, that the 1974
amendment to section 224 effected no substantive change and requires no
reevaluation of our conclusion that the exemption prescribed in section
224 is not limited to the property of a "householder."
[4]
Having rejected County's argument that the term "any person" in section
224 is restricted to "householders," we have no difficulty concluding
that "any person" includes a nonprofit corporation homeowners'
association such as Association. Section 19 expressly provides:
"'Person' includes any person, firm, partnership, association,
corporation, company, syndicate, estate, trust, business trust, or
organization of any kind." Section 5 provides: "Unless the context
otherwise requires, the general provisions hereinafter set forth govern
the construction of this code." County, of course, urges that the
context does otherwise require, because section 224 applies only to the
property of a "householder," and Association is incapable of being a
"householder." However, we have rejected the premise that section 224 is
limited to "householders," and County's conclusion that the context
otherwise requires falls with the premise.
[5] We must also
reject County's somewhat interrelated argument that to be exempt
property must be physically a part of an established household which it
defines as "a place where a group of individuals dwell under the same
roof and compose a family."
In the first place, since the
persons entitled to the statutory exemption need not be "householders,"
it would be anomalous to defeat the legislative intent to exempt all
persons owning personal property of the designated type by imposition of
a requirement that the property be part of an established "household."
Where there is an established "household"
[86 Cal. App. 3d 405]
there is most likely a "householder," and the elimination of the
requirement for the latter is a forceful argument for rejection of the
former. Furthermore, the legislative history surrounding the 1969
amendment to section 224 rather explicitly indicates that one of the
motivations for the amendment was to prevent the assessment of household
belongings kept in storage by nonhouseholders. fn. 7 This is manifested
in the provision of a regulation promulgated by the State Board of
Equalization, the relevant portion of which reads: "Storage in a
warehouse or other place of safekeeping in and of itself does not alter
the status of such property ..." (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, § 134 [see
fn. 2, ante].) Rather obviously, property held in storage by a
nonhouseholder is not physically part of an established household as
defined by County. Nevertheless, both the legislative history of section
224 and the regulation clearly indicate that such property, if it would
otherwise constitute "household furnishings," was intended to be
exempt.
Thus, it appears that the legislative design in
specifying "household furnishings" as the exempt property was not to
require physical integration of the property into an established
dwelling or abode, but to define descriptively or generically a class of
personal property exempted by the statute. In other words, "household
furnishings" as that term is used in section 224 refers to personal
property of the type or class normally found or used in, or associated
with, a household and which is held or kept for household use or
purposes.
This definition coincides with that adopted by the
State Board of Equalization in its letter opinion to County's assessor
concerning this matter issued April 22, 1975, pursuant to Government
Code section 15606. The opinion signed by tax counsel for the board
states: "Household furnishings, therefore, mean those items of personal
property normally found around the home and used by members of a
family." fn. 8
[86 Cal. App. 3d 406]
County contends,
however, that "the subject personal property is not kept or used by
anyone for 'household' purposes." Its argument appears to be that since
the assessed property was located in and around Association's clubhouse
where no one resides and which constitutes a tax parcel separate and
apart from any on which a home is situated, the property cannot be said
to be kept or held for household use or purposes. We cannot agree that
"household use" or "purposes" is to be given such a narrow meaning.
Indeed, the restricted meaning ascribed by County to this expression
reflects its view, already rejected by us, that "household furnishings"
is restricted to property of a "householder" physically a part of a
"household."
Moreover, the restricted meaning County would
ascribe to "household use" or "purposes" is contrary to the persuasive
portions of the letter opinion of the State Board of Equalization upon
which it relies. After stating, as previously mentioned, that "household
furnishings" means "those items of personal property normally found
around the home and used by members of a family," the opinion goes on:
"This definition, however, should not be so narrowly construed as to
exclude property owned in common with others when it is used as
household furnishings. Also 'family' should not be looked upon in the
strict sense, but should include groups of persons living together and
even individuals living separately. [Italics added.]
"At times,
residents of condominium and planned-unit development projects share the
ownership of personal property used in conjunction with recreational
and other facilities such as game rooms, swimming pools, and dining
rooms. Developers of such projects undoubtedly found buyers interested
in joint ownership, and the providing of such facilities to be an
inducement for sales. The nature of the facilities varies considerably
from project to project, depending on the developer's idea of what the
desires and needs of their particular buyers will be. The more elaborate
projects offer a separate clubhouse with recreational and athletic
facilities.
"We believe that the household furnishings and
personal effects exemption applies to some, but not all, of the personal
property used in conjunction with facilities of the type we have been
discussing. In order for personal property to be physically part of a
household we believe it must be located on the same parcel of real
property serving as the location of one or more living units of the
joint owners. Personalty located on a separate
[86 Cal. App. 3d 407]
parcel, such as would be improved with a clubhouse, is too remote from
any household to be included within the exemption. [Italics added.]
"We also would not extend the exemption to any personal property owned
by a homeowners' association, whether it is incorporated or
unincorporated, on the basis that the exemption only extends to natural
persons. We have already noted that 'household' connotes use by members
of a family, and while we believe that it is appropriate and necessary
to include single persons and groups of individuals living together
within this term, we do not believe that the term has application to
separate entities that exist only in legal contemplation."
[6]
While the construction of a statute by the officials charged with its
administration is entitled to great weight, final responsibility for the
interpretation of the law rests with the courts. (Sanchez v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 20 Cal. 3d 55, 67 [141 Cal. Rptr. 146, 569 P.2d 740]; Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733,
748 [63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697].) We fully agree with the letter
opinion of the board to the extent it indicates that "household
furnishings" should not be narrowly defined and that, to the extent the
concept of "family" is involved, it "should not be looked upon in the
strict sense, but should include groups of persons living together and
even individuals living separately." Giving "family" that broad
interpretation, we also accept board's view that household use or
purposes "connotes use by members of a family." That is precisely
correct. "Household use" or "purposes" means the uses customarily made
of personal property by an individual or several individuals in
conjunction with their home or other living quarters.
So,
contrary to County's assertion, the assessed property was and is kept
for household use or purposes. It is held by Association for the
exclusive use of its members, all of whom are and are required to be
homeowners, as an adjunct to and in connection with their residences.
The use of the property made by Association's members is clearly
"household" use, that is, it is the kind of use customarily made of such
personal property by members of a family in connection with their home
or residence. Indeed, broadly defined, their use is familial. Contrary
to County's argument, their use is not the same as that of the members
of a fraternal lodge or service club. The distinguishing feature is that
Association's members use the property in conjunction with and in a
real sense as a part of their home. By contrast, the use made of
recreational equipment and furnishings by members of a fraternal
organization or service club is not an adjunct to their residences or
homes and is not the
[86 Cal. App. 3d 408] kind of use customarily made by a family of personal property in conjunction with their home or living quarters.
Board's opinion apparently recognizes the propriety of these
conclusions for it indicates that the statutory exemption would be
applicable to the assessed property if it were located "on the same
parcel of real property serving as the location of one or more living
units ..." We cannot accept, however, the conclusion that to be exempt
the property must be located on the same parcel as one or more living
units. The use to which the property is put or the purpose for which it
is kept is not determined by the parcel on which it is located. There is
nothing in the statute or its history nor in common sense or logic that
justifies this distinction and it must be concluded it is purely
artificial and arbitrary. It appears to be based in large part on the
already discredited assumption that to be exempt property must be
"physically part of a household." Even if the distinction had some
rational basis in the abstract, it would have none here, for, as
previously indicated, the real property taxes levied against the
clubhouse and the parcel of land on which it is located are assessed to
the separately owned residential property owned by Association's members
pursuant to section 2188.5. Thus, for purposes of property taxation,
the parcel upon which the clubhouse is situated is not completely
separate and distinct from the parcels on which the membership's homes
are built.
Needless to say, we also cannot accept the conclusion
in the letter opinion that the exemption extends only to natural
persons. This is but a variant of the conclusion that the exemption
extends only to the property of "householders." As previously explained,
"any person" as used in section 224 includes a nonprofit corporation
such as Association by virtue of the definition of "person" found in
section 19.
The use of the assessed property made by
Association's members is in practical effect the same as that made by a
family of furnishings and recreational property in and around their
home. The property is the functional equivalent of furnishings and
recreational equipment used by a family in and around their home. Our
conclusion that the property constitutes "household furnishings"
exempted from property taxation under section 224 fully accords with the
stated legislative purpose for the last substantive amendment to the
section in 1969, "to assure that all persons in the same circumstances
throughout the state will be treated equally." (Stats. 1969, ch. 88, §
4, p. 212.)
[86 Cal. App. 3d 409]
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for plaintiff.
McDaniel, J., and Morris, J., concurred.
FN 1. The trial court concluded in part: "4. In order for personal
property to be entitled to the 'personal effects and household
furnishings exemption,' the property (a) must be physically part of a
household ...
"5. A household is a domestic establishment in
which a group of individuals dwell under the same roof as a family on a
regular basis.
"6. The clubhouse ... is not a household because
it is not a domestic establishment in which a group of individuals dwell
under the same roof as a family on a regular basis.
"7. The
subject property is not entitled to the 'personal effects and household
furnishings' exemption because it is not physically part of a household.
"8. A corporation cannot maintain a household.
"9. ... The word 'person' in Section 224 must be limited to persons
who own or possess property which is physically part of a household."
FN 2. Pursuant to its statutory authority (Gov. Code, § 15606) the
State Board of Equalization has promulgated a regulation which purports
to identify the kinds of property eligible for the exemption set forth
in section 224. It provides in part: "Household furnishings are personal
property and include such items as furniture, appliances, rugs, cooking
utensils, and art objects. ... [¶] Personal effects is a category of
personal property which includes such items as money kept for household
use, clothing, jewelry, tools, hobby equipment and collections, and
other recreational equipment. By statute, it does not include boats,
aircraft and vehicles.
"* * *
"Storage in a warehouse or
other place of safekeeping in and of itself does not alter the status
of such property ... "(Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, § 134.)
FN 3.
Prior to 1933 the Legislature was not authorized to enact statutory
property tax exemptions. (See People v. Latham, 52 Cal. 598, 602;
Minturn, et al. v. Hays, 2 Cal. 590, 592.) In 1933 article XIII, section
14 of the Constitution was amended to provide in part: "[T]he
Legislature, two-thirds of all of the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, may classify any and all kinds of
personal property for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a
manner and at a rate or rates in proportion to value different from any
other property in this State subject to taxation and may exempt entirely
from taxation any or all forms, types or classes of personal property."
(See now art. XIII, § 2 (added Nov. 5, 1974).)
FN 4. It was
apparently the legislative intent that, together, article XIII section
10 1/2, and sections 210 and 224 would have the effect of exempting from
taxation all household furnishings and personal effects. The 1968
amendments to sections 210 and 224 were expressly made inoperative
unless Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 1, known as Proposition 1-a,
should be approved by the voters in the general election on November 5,
1968. (Stats. 1969, First Ex. Sess. 1968, ch. 1, § 34, p. 24.) The
pamphlet distributed to the voters by the Secretary of State in
connection with Proposition 1-a included an analysis by the Legislative
Counsel which purported to summarize the effects of the amendments to
sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code made contingent upon the
passage of the proposition. It stated in relevant part: "Exempts all
household furnishings and personal effects of a householder ..." The
argument in favor of the passage of the proposition included in the
pamphlet stated: "The property tax on household belongings will be
totally eliminated."
FN 5. Section 210.5 was also amended in
1974 (Stats. 1974, ch. 311, § 18, p. 593). It reads: "The surviving
spouse of an established household, whether with or without dependents,
as long as the family home is maintained is a householder and is
entitled to the exemption from taxation provided by subdivision (m) of
Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution of California." (Italics
added.)
FN 6. The pertinent statement read: "The purpose of this
amendment is not to make a change in our present tax structure, but to
make the Constitution more readable and workable. To accomplish this
goal, some of the present provisions are transferred to statute. None of
these transferred provisions, however, are of a substantive nature.
This means that the essence of the present Article is retained, but made
more understandable."
FN 7. The staff analysis of Senate Bill
No. 153 which eventually became chapter 88 of the 1969 Statutes
contained the following note: "(This was suggested by the State Board of
Equalization after the Assessors of several counties required storage
companies to report household goods in storage with the intent to assess
these against the owner if not owning or renting a residence.)"
FN 8. The definition of "household furnishings" in these terms is also
consistent with County's interpretation of the State Board of
Equalization's regulation found in section 134 of title 18 of the
California Administrative Code purporting to set forth examples of the
type of property that is included within the terms "household
furnishings" and "personal effects." (See fn. 2, ante.) County
interprets the regulation as specifying as personal effects which are
exempt only those which are "kept for household use." We are not called
upon in this appeal to determine the validity of County's interpretation
of the regulation.